Juvenile crime is not a new problem, but the dimensions have changed dramatically. When the juvenile justice system was nrst created more tilan a century ago, children were committing relatively minor crimes and youth were considered to be more easily rehabilitated than adults. The emphasis of the system was on treatment and rehabilitation. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, a court could act as a guardian of a minor child when problems occurred with the family or in schoo1. 3 The court was able to take custody of neglected or delinquent children and place them in reform schools to prevent future problems.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the ftrst juvenile courts were established apart: from the adult system. The new system had a wide jurisdiction, ranging from serious criminal offenders to neglected children. 4 The juvenile courts were designed to focus on the "best interests of the child" and have greater flexibility in deciding appropriate treatment.
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Beginning with the In re Gault decision in 1967, the Supreme Court mandated for the ftrst time procedural safeguards for juvenile offenders. As a result, any juvenile charged with a serious crime has the right to a notice of charges, a hearing, and assistance of counse1. 6 Additionally, juveniles must be proven guilty by the criminal standard of 6 "beyond a reasonable doubt." However, in most jurisdictions, juveniles do not have the right to a jUly triaP Today, many citizens believe tile juvenile justice system is too lenient. The American public is calling for harsher sentences for juveniles convicted of the most serious crimes. In a 1993 Gallup poll, 73 percent of the respondents said that juveniles who commit violent crimes should be treated the same as adults.
H The public outcry to curb violent juvenile crime has reached a new urgency.
Grim statistics support public perception that serious juvenile crime is increasing at an alamling rate. From 1982 to 1991, juvenile arrests for violent crimes almost doubled.
During this ten-year period, the number of juvenile arrests for murder increased by 93 percent and for aggravated assault by 71 percent:. 9 The most dramatic rise in violent juvenile crime began in 1988. From 1987 From to 1991 was a 50 percent increase in juveniles arrested for violent crime. 10 Youth crime is not only becoming increasingly violent, but crimes are being committed by younger children. In 1990, more than half of the delinquency cases handled by U.S. juvenile courts involved youth age ftfteen or younger. Children age twelve and under committed thirty-five murders and five thousand aggravated assaults in 1991.11
Juvenile cases involve teenagers and children charged with murder, rape, armed robbery, and aggravated assault. A system that was designed to handle minor offenses over a century ago is struggling to adequately address the existing juvenile crime problem. Lawmakers and judges have responded by transferring some of the more serious juveniles to adult court. Some states have passed strict gun control laws. Nevertheless, the juvenile crime problem is steadily growing worse. The current system must be reformed.
According to U.S. Department of Justice statistics, over fifty-three thousand youth are confined to public juvenile correctional facilities nationwide; not surprisingly, overcrowding has become a serious problem. By 1991, juvenile detention and correctional facilities had exceeded design capacity by 47 percent.
12 Overcrowded correctional facilities result in increased institutional violence and suicidal behavior.
13 Under such conditions, peer pressure from other delinquent juveniles is pervasive.
Today, many citizens believe the juvenile justice system is too lenient. ...
In a 1993 Gallup pol~ 73 percent Of the respondents said that juveniles who commit violent crimes should be treated the same as adults.
The challenge for policy makers is to design a juvenile justice system that will most effectively address both the small number of dangerous violent offenders and emphasize rehabilitation and prevention for the majority of juvenile delinquents. Accordingly, this article analyzes several alternatives for juvenile justice reform. The various options considered in this article include adult sentencing, mandatory sentencing, boot camps, community-based programs, and a comprehensive prevention strategy. This discussion identifies various alternatives aimed at reducing juvenile crime and recidivism while minimizing costs. Each alternative will be described and analyzed against the criteria identified below.
When looking at juvenile justice reform, a viable policy should reduce crime, be cost-effective, and be acceptable to the public and elected officials. Therefore, the three criteria most critical for this analysis are effectiveness, political viability, and cost.
The effectiveness criterion assesses to what extent a proposed program reduces crime and prevents juvenile offenders from committing additional crime. The short-term and long-term effects of the alternatives will be examined.
Measuring the political viability involves assessing the acceptability of eacll proposal to various interested groups, e.g., parents, elected officials, and youth advocates. Key stakeholders must be identified who possess dle resources, power, and influence to support or reject the various alternatives. By utilizing the criterion of political feaSibility, this
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article investigates which of several alternatives can be implemented with the least political opposition, and what, if any, efforts may be needed to make an alternative more acceptable.
The fmal criterion concerns the costs of each proposed option, including additional oudays required by the government and taxpayers. These costs may be one-time or recurring and include operating and maintenance expenses. Using tWs criterion helps identify the alternative that is most cost-effective in redUCing crime and re-arrest rates.
In order to effectively examine the proposed approaches to dle juvenile crime problem, we must acknowledge the interrelatedness of the criteria which are used in the evaluation. The measures used both complement and contradict one another. For example, an option which is effective in redUCing juvenile recidivism rates may be expensive to implement. The cost of the program may also reduce its political feasibility. Understanding how criteria are interconnected is important in determining whether certain modifications can be made to make an option more politically viable.
Sentencing in Adult Courts
Public sentiment supports the prosecution of juveniles as adults, and many state legislatures have responded by passing laws which automatically prosecute youths as adults for violent crime. In 1993; the Colorado, Utah, and Florida legislatures passed laws permitting specific categories of youth offenders to be prosecuted as adults. 14 In eleven states, youdl at certain ages are excluded from juvenile court. IS For example, in New York, youth over age sixteen charged with serious crimes, and minors age thirteen to flfteen accused of certain violent crimes, are prosecuted in adult criminal COUrts. 16 As a result of such laws, large numbers of juveniles are already being tried as adults.
Juveniles can also be sent to adult court d1fough judicial waiver. Transfers of juveniles to adult criminal courts increased 68 percent between 1988 and 1992.17 In fortyeight states, juvenile court judges already have some discretion to waive jurisdiction of juveniles to criminal court at dle request of prosecutors. IS While sentencing juveniles in adult court is often justified under the rationale of public safety (which diverges from d1e original intent of the juvenile justice system to protect the best interests of the child), this rationale for adult sentencing does not have a firm grounding in fact. TIle majority of juveniles sent to adult court are not those charged with the most serious violent offenses. Most juveniles transferred to adult COUlts are chronic property offenders or repeat drug offenders. Between 1984 and 1990, more than half of the juveniles sent to adult ptisons were convicted of property offenses and only about 8 percent were convicted of murder or manslaughter. 19 Although public perception holds that juvenile offenders are treated leniently by juvenile courts, several studies show just the opposite: juveniles are treated more leniently when transferred to adult court. Of course, the definition of "lenient" here is relevant only to the circumstances--juveniles are treated less harshly in adult courts because juveniles receive shorter sentences than adults appearing in the same court. And since the differing sentences imposed on juveniles and adults may be the result of language in state or federal law, juveniles are treated "leniently" by criminal courts only in compatison to tile competition (adults).
Age often becomes a mitigating factor in adult court. Over half of the juveniles transferred to adult COUlt are placed on probation. 20 In 1992, tile California Department of Corrections reports tilat while youth in the juvenile system spent 60 montIls in incarceration for homicide, adults spent only 40 months in adult prisons for similar homicide offenses. For robbery, juveniles spent an average of 30 months in youth correctional facilities compared to 25 monilis for adults.
In addition, laws that transfer jurisdiction of juveniles to adult court may not be effective in reducing crime. One recent study in Idaho found iliat arrest rates actually increased by 14 percent after the enactment of mandatory waiver laws. 21 In Florida, the state wiili ilie highest number of juveniles sent to adult prisons, the Department of Justice found that juveniles are more likely to retum to crime after release from adult prisons. 22 An evaluation of New York's 1978 juvenile offender law revealed that mandatory waiver of juveniles to adult court had not been effective in reducing juvenile crime. 23 However, in a study of 16-and 17-year-olds accused of burglary, researchers in New York and New Jersey found iliat in tlle juvenile system, youth were re-arrested less often and remained crime free for longer periods of time.
24
Anoilier more serious implication is tllat adult sentencing dismisses ilie idea iliat juveniles have potential for rehabilitation. Adult prisons deprive youths of tile rehabilitation programs normally received in a juvenile correctional setting. If juveniles are not given an opportunity for rehabilitation, a 13-year-old serving a 20-year sentence in prison 8 will eventually be released wiili little chance of reassinilla tion into society. Further, in adult prisons, juveniles are often subject to abuse, rape, and exploitation by adult inmates.
2
; Juveniles who spend their formative years in adult prisons are likely to become career crinlinals and eventually re-enter society wiiliout rehabilitation, education, or work skills.
Lest we think iliat sentencing juveniles to adult prisons is ilie panacea for all the ailments of ilie juvenile justice system, it should be noted iliat adult prisons are extremely costly and overcrowded. The Federal Bureau of Prisons reports ilie average cost of incarcerating one inmate is $20 iliousand per year. 26 Furthel~ many adult prisons already exceed capacity, and new prisons would have to be constructed to accommodate an influx of juveniles. The costs of building and operating new prisons to house juveniles i adult or separate facilities will be prohibitive for most state
The challenge for policy makers is .to design a juvenile justice system that will most effectively address both the small number of dangerous violent offenders and emphasize rehabilitation and prevention for the majority of juvenile delinquents.
The costs associated with building new adult facilities are high. Typically, construction costs can range between $50 thousand and $70 thousand per juvenile and an additiona $10 to $15 thousand to maintain, guard, and manage ead prisoner. 27 A high security facility costs approximately $55 million to build.28 Many states are already faced with a lack of funds for ilie operation of newly-constmcted prisons.
29 Placing juveniles into already overcrowded adult prisons wiiliout t11e money to build new facilities will leac to disaster.
Despite iliese problems, many states have already passed laws transferring juveniles to adult court, indicating d1at ili~ political feasibility of iliis option is fairly high. By passing mandatory waiver laws, legislatures have given voice to ilie more punitive attitudes held by many members of ilie general pUblic. Nevertheless, many parents, youth advocates, and juvenile justice officials vehemently oppose adult sentencing because it overlooks the opportunity for rehabilitating youili and puts juveniles at serious risk in adult prisons.
Longer, Mandatory Sentencing
Although many segments of society are demanding longer, mandatory sentencing for violent youth offenders, the states appear to be resisting any effort to pass such laws; in fact, thus far, mandatory sentencing laws have only applied to adults who have committed drug or gun-related offenses.
One of the flaws with mandatOlY sentencing for violent youth offenders is that such tactics would add to the already desperate overcrowding in juvenile facilities. In 1989, the Federal Bureau of Prisons began a nationwide building program to increase prison capacity by fifty thousand beds; unfortunately, this project is not expected to be completed until 1997. In Virginia, the estimated cost of building a 950-bed youth and family services facility in 1995 is $47.8 million.
30
Research shows that programs which do not emphasize rehabilitation have little impact on reducing juvenile crime.
31 Thus, the extended use of incarceration for youth offenders has questionable public safety benefits. Because 81 percent of YOUtil are arrested for non-violent crimes, longer mandatory sentences will increase the use of incarceration for non-violent offenders.
Instead of ensuring public safety, mandatory sentencing is more likely to turn non-violent juvenile offenders into hardened criminals who will eventually be released into society without sufficient rehabilitation. Two recent studies in the District of Columbia have confirmed that a large number of committed juveniles are not hardened and could benefit from alternative placements.
32 Mandatory sentencing ignores the fundamental objective of rehabilitating wayward youth and preventing them from committing additional crimes.
Although the general public favors mandatory sentencing, taxpayers may not be willing to pay additional taxes to build and operate new prison facilities for the surge of new inmates resulting from such a policy. In addition, political officials may not be eager to move in this direction because of tile high costs associated with longer incarceration and building new facilities. Longer, mandatory sentencing only adds to the problems associated with overcrowding, e.g., higher rates of violence and suicidal behavior. 33 Youth advocates and parents of at-risk youth favor rehabilitating juveniles rather than incarcerating YOUtil in large correctional facilities for a longer time.
Mandatory sentencing is also extremely costly. Large staterun juvenile correctional programs are already expensive, costing tile state and taxpayers between' $35,000 to $60,000
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each year for the incarceration of one juvenile. 34 The annual cost of housing one youth at the Oak Hill Juvenile Correction Center in Laurel, Maryland, is estimated at $40,000. 35 Other experts report that the average cost of a juvenile detention center is between $75,000 and $100,000 per bed. 36 Additionally, there are enormous costs associated with tile "revolving door" of the juvenile courts. From 60 to 80 percent of all juveniles are rearrested and prosecuted again in juvenile court. 3 ?
An additional price tag associated Witll mandatory sentencing is the cost of defending or settling lawsuits filed by inmates challenging the conditions of confinement. For instance, the District of Columbia has paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines for failing to address the juvenile overcrowding problem. The District was also under a court order to close one severely overcrowded juvenile facility, address overcrowding in two other facilities, and develop community-based alternatives. Because the District failed to comply with the court order, plaintiffs in tllis case are now asking that a $3 million fine be imposed on the District of Columbia and that daily fines for overcrowding be increased from $1,000 per facility to $1,000 per juvenile.
JA
In a similar matter, in October 1992, a class action suit was filed on behalf of minors confmed in the San Diego Juvenile Hall alleging that overcrowding endangered the physical, emotional, and psychological well-being of children. 39 The court ordered increases in staffmg, mental health services, and rehabilitation for all youth detained in the San Diego Juvenile Hall for longer than fifteen days. Also, each minor suspected of suffering from a mental illness was to be evaluated by a psychiatrist. Additionally, tlle judge ordered that if the San Diego Probation Department lacked adequate resources, the County Treasurer was required to assure proper medical treatment. 40 The District of Columbia and San Diego cases demonstrate that class action suits due to the conditions of overcrowded juvenile facilities result in costly litigation and expensive corrective measures.
Youth Boot Camps
As an alternative to prisons, boot camps provide militarystyle structure, rules, and discipline for convicted young offenders. Most camps have military drills, hard physical training, and work details. A number of boot camp programs offer vocational training, drug and alcohol counseling, and education. The typical duration of a boot camp assignment is 90 to 120 days while some programs may last as long as six months. In place of large, state-fun training schoois, small, secure, commUnity-based facilities offer inten..<;ive treatment and rehabilitation services for violent offenders and highly-structured, commUnity-based programs for non-violent juveniles. Youth who have conunitted the more serious, violent offen..<;es are hou"ied in small, secure facilities of 35-40 beds per unit. Because of the small scale of these program'>, staff are able to provide individual treatment, counseling, and supervision. Close proximity to the community allows regular family involvement with juvenile rehabilitation.
Non-violent youth who do not require residential placement are assigned to a wide range of community-based alternatives, such as group homes, home detention, wilderness camps, day treatment, and outreach and tracking program'>. lhese programs provide intensive supervision in the community, as well as coun..<;eling and a t;tructured environment. Additionally, all juveniles participate in a variety of treatment and educational community program'>. Massachusetts' large state tr.aining schools were replaced by a network of small, secure progt'am'i for Violent offenders and a larger number of highly-structured community-based programs. The small scale of the program permits staff to individualize treatment, rehabilitation, and counseling services. The ft'nlaining non-violent youth are divided lx-ween non-secure residential progt'ams, day treatment progt'.am'l, and group homes and all participate in a wide variety of treatment and educ:Hional community progt'am'l.'J Utah llaS the most comprehensive copy of the Mas..<;achusett'l progmm. In 1980, faced with litigation for civil rights violations, Utah dosed its 450-bed state training school.<l Contract'i with private agencies for services designed to meet the needs of youth were funded with money formerly spent maintaining the state youth training schools. For youth who require secure confinement, Utah maintains two 35~bed, secure, intensive treatment units." The remaining youth were placed in group homes, shelter care, and outreach programs.
Maryland, PennsylVania, and Florida are moving in the same direction as Mas..<;achusetts and Utah. Maryland ha.<; closed one tr.aining school and reduced the population of the remaining juvenile correctional facility. Pennsylvania replaced its tmining school with a combination of prof,rramc; admini~tered by state and private organi7.ations.
Smaller community-lY.ased progt'.ams, with individualized treatment services, have lower recidivism mtes, especially when combined with re-entry and aftercare services. In comparison to three other states, the Mas...,achusetts Department of Youth Services (MDYS) facilities llad lower recidivism rates than those in states which rely on more tmditional large-sc.<lle training schools.'~ Maryland's National Center on Institutions and Alternatives (NCIA) has been actively placing inc.arcerated juveniles in commUnity-based program., since 1987. Over a thirteenmonth period, only 31 out of the 497 juveniles relea.<;ed from secure confmement returned to institutions.'" The Mas..-;achusett<;, Utah, and Maryland examples demonstrate that corrununity-ba.'led program'> are effective in reducing recidivL'>m rates among juveniles.
TIle couuuunity-based approach is politically appealing be<:a1.L.'Ie such programs offer an ek'lllent of punishment as well as rembilitation. The Mas .. -;ach1.L.'it.'tt'l and Utah reforms received broad biparti<;a.n fX)litical support. " Other states, such as Texas, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Florida, have begun to move in the direction of community-based ~,.ystem.'i.';I! Small, secure treatment facilities and community-based pro~ gt'J.Ill..'> are much less co,.'5dy than large con-ectional Jru.1:itutions. Estimates are that the MDYS program saves approximately $11 million per year. 'l<j The aVL'fage cost per youth is about $23 thousand a year compared to the $35 to $4S tho1.L.'land per juvenile spent by large corrections progr.lm'i in many other states."; In Utah, the shift to communitybased programs resulted in a ck'Cl'ea.<;e of $250 tho1.L.%l.nd from the cost of the old institutional-based system.
Comprehensive Prevention Strategy
This alternative uses educational and vrx;:ational training, life skills development, and family counseling to reduce violent juvenile crime. A number of studies clearly show that chronic juvenile offenders start their criminal careers prior to age twelve and often continue into adulthood.
M To be effective, treatment programs need to begin in early childhood and must be tailored to the unique set of risk and causal factors associated with each youth.
Recent research has identified the major factors affecting delinquency: high-crime neighborhoods, weak family attachments, poor school performance, delinquent peer groups, lack of consistent discipline and behavioral monitoring, and physical or sexual abuse./ij Prevention programs emphasize healthy social, physical, and mental development of youth and involve all components of the community including schools, families, and community-based organizations. 63 Prevention progmm'i require communities to identify the primary rL ... k factors faced by children and implement program'> aimed at countering these risks. A variety of progt'ams may be needed involving families, schools, peers, and community businesses. Parental support groups, family skills training programs, and family crisis intervention services could be adopted to as5L~t at-risk families. One program funded by the National Institute of Mental Health in Greenville, South Carolina, teaches parents alternative methods of discipline and as..')ist'i with basic needs, such as jobs and housing. In Austin, Texas, the Children~at-Risk Program is aimed at diverting inner-dty kids from involvement with drugs, gangs and crime.
In addition to families, schools playa key role in crime prevention. Schoo) progrJm., nUlY include vi()lem~ preven- Most social scientists agree that early intervention in the lives of at-risk children is probably the most effective way to tackle violent crime.
6
; Research demonstrates dlat most youth offenders have lillie understanding of alternatives to violent action and accept the certainty of a dismal and limited future. Most juvenile offenders have seen violence as a regular part of their environment, and many have been victims themselves. Clearly, comprehensive prevention programs that change the risk factors which push youd1 toward violent behavior will be most effective in the long mn.
Although prevention and education at an early age may be the best long-term solution, many Americans are growing impatient wid1 juvenile crime. The American public may not be willing to wait for the benefits of such efforts without more immediate attempts to address the problem. Investment in delinquency prevention may not be a high priority for elected officials facing many other human service demands and shrinking budgets. Further, elected officials may not have the luxury of selecting such a costly option that has no visible and immediate public safety benefits.
Attacking the juvenile crime problem at an early stage is ambitious and costly. Although research exists about a variety of treatment and rehabilitation programs, much more needs to be understood about what works best in preventing serious, violent juvenile crime. Follow-up research and extensive evaluation of performance is needed to determine the results in a variety of settings over time.
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Conclusion
Each of the options has merits and demerits; however, one is clearly superior to other choices. Small, secure correctional facilities and community-based programs clearly stands out as the best policy option.
Community-based programs are already experiencing tremendous success in rehabilitating juveniles. Small, treatment-oriented facilities reduce recidivism among the most serious juvenile offenders up to 70 percent. Individualized treatment and counseling, combined with re-entry and aftercare services, have gready contributed to the lower rearrest rates. Programs of d1is nature have had very positive results in a variety of states with different politics, culture, economies, and geography. With an emphasis on family and community involvement, these programs offer opportunities for juveniles that policies which focus on incarceration lack.
Small, community-based programs offer states maxin1um flexibility in designing appropriate placement based on an individual youth's needs. For non-violent juvenile offenders, alternative treatment is available without incurring the high costs of prisons. Immediate adjustments can be made if the program fails to meet the needs of juveniles. Community-based programs are overall much less expensive than large, state-mn correctional programs.
Community-based programs are also politically appealing because of the intermediate philosophy of combining treatment and punishment. Many elected officials, and particularly dIe public, need to be better informed of the costeffectiveness of community-based programs. Therefore, a public education strategy would be helpful in making these programs more politically viable.
The comprehensive prevention strategy is the most effective long-term option but is also cosdy and less politically viable than community-based programs. Prevention programs must begin in early childhood and be aimed at preventing the multiple risk factors affecting youth. A variety of programs will be needed to address diverse needs. Because the focus of a comprehensive prevention program is longrange, an assessment must be conducted several years after the program's implementation. Additional research is needed to accurately measure the results of such a program. 'This option, howt.'Ver, deserves serious considerdtion as a long-term solution to juvenile crime prt."Vention. Because a comprehensive prevention stmtegy offers education, vcx~a tional trdining, parenting skills, and family counseling aimed at the risk factors of juvenile c'rime, thL<; alternative will be the most effective in the long run. According to social scientist'l, early prevention and treatment progrAms art' needed to reduce the risk factors which push youth toward crime in tht:.· first phlce.
Srnal4 secure correctional facilities and community-based programs are clearly more effective arld less costly than large juvenile corrections programs and boot camps.
Although the public tends to support adult and mandatory sentencing, the cost of implementation is high. Furthermore, studies clearly show that this approach is ineffective in reducing re-arrest rates. Non-violent youth offenders who could be placed in alternative programs are locked up in expensive prisons. Phtdng juveniles in prisons for longer periods of time incurs high co~1:s and turns juveniles into career criminals.
Another option which al'io enjoys a great deal of public support-boot camps--has high re-arrest mtes and L' i as costly as bUilding additional prisons. Furthermore, the longer the period that boot camp grAduates are free, the higher the chance of re-arrest. While some boot camps offer treatment and rehabilitation programs, few provide the vocational skills or aftercare services needed for successful transition into community life.
Both of these options ignore the opportunity for rehabilitation and education for the majority of non-violent youth. Instead, the youthful offenders are placed into confmement with much older and more seasoned criminals. Contrary to popular belief, these "get-tough" policies provide a faL<ie seme of security and have questionable public safety benefits. Additionally, such programs ignore the opportunity for rehabilitation and education for the majority of non-violent youth and, in'itead, tum juveniles into tough criminals. Adult and manclatory sentencing only add" to prL'iOn (lVt~rcrowding at increased cnsts to the taxpayers. 111e puhlic ends up paying the high C(lsts of building and ()p(~rating new t;lCilities to rdit.'Vc~ th{~ overcrowding of prL'>-ons with non-violent dnlg and property offenders.
Notes
Small. secure correctional facilities and community-based programs are dearly more eftet'tive and Ie,," costly than huge juvenile correction'! progmms and boot camps. To make this option more politically viable, the progr'dm should be accompanied by a public (~Iucation strategy which would infoffil the community of the benetlt'i of such an approach. 1ne strategy would t.'<.iucate people about the low recidivism rate of small, treatment-oriented faciliti<.'S and the ineffe<.'tiveness of the "get-tough" policies. Because of the great concern for public safety, the community may need to be reassured that violent offenders will be locked up in secure facilities and provided intensive counseling and rehabilitation. Elected official'i and the public must also be educated about the importance of successfully rehabilitating and educating youth who will eventually reenter SOciety.
Money and resources must follow juveniles out of the institution.<; and into the community. State legislatures would have to reallocate funci'> to ensure the success of these program.". States would also need to provide oversight and evaluation to ensure effective and eqUitable delinquency treatment.
Small, secure correctional facilities and (x)mmunity-based programs will not solve all of the problems associated with juvenile crime. For this reason, serious cO(k'>ideration should al'lO be given to a longer-term prevention strategy.
Although more costly, a policy aimed at the rL'ik factors which lead to juvenile crime k'i needed for success in juvenile crime pre.'Vention.*
